By:  Ty Hyderally, Esq., Jannifer Vorih, Esq., and Tom Daly.

Last month, the Third Circuit handed down an employee-friendly ruling in Uronis v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No. 21-1874, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 25727 (3d Cir. Sept. 14, 2022). In February 2019, Uronis’s former co-worker filed a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) against Cabot and another entity, Carrie’s Transport & Rental, LLC. See, Messenger v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No. 19-cv-308 (M.D. Pa.). This action alleged that Carrie’s and Cabot jointly employed the class members and failed to pay them overtime wages required under the FLSA. Uronis, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 25727 at *3. Uronis was a hypothetical (putative) member of the Messenger action, as a similarly situated employee who had yet to file a consent to join the collective action. Id. at *3.

In August 2019, Uronis applied for a position with Cabot’s subsidiary, Gassearch Drilling Services Corporation. Id. at *3. Later that month, a Gassearch manager sent Uronis the below text message:

“Unfortunately I found out … that no one who worked for [the owner of Carrie’s] is supposed to be on a Cabot location. Pretty much because of the lawsuit that’s going on.  I can’t do anything to get you into [Gassearch]… Maybe once the lawsuit deal dies out it might be a possibility again. I wish I could get you in, believe me you’d be better than some of the guys we’ve been interviewing. Also turning a lot down for the same reasons.”

Id. at *4.

Uronis had not alleged that he informed anyone at Cabot or Gassearch that he planned to testify in the Messenger action beyond an unspecific allegation that he had contacted the lead plaintiff about opting into the class. Id. at *4. After he was passed over for employment because of the Messenger action, Uronis filed the underlying complaint alleging that he and other similarly situated employees were retaliated against based upon the perception that they were involved in class action litigation adverse to Cabot and Gassearch. Id. at *5. The District Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis that the plaintiff was not “about to testify” because he was not “scheduled” to testify. Id. at *5. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the “about to testify” language in Section 15(a)(3) protects employees from discrimination where an employer simply anticipates that the employee will soon file a consent to join a collective action. Id. at *2.

The FLSA prohibits discrimination against employees who have engaged in a protected activity. Protected activities include conduct where an “employee has filed any complaint… related to this Act [] or has testified or is about to testify in any [FLSA] proceeding…” 29 USCS § 215(a)(3) (also known as Section 15(a)(3)). As a remedial statute, the FLSA, including Section 15(a)(3), is to be broadly construed, and “must not be interpreted or applied in a narrow, grudging manner.” Uronis, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 25727 at *9 (citing Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1987)). Accordingly, courts have interpreted Section 15(a)(3) as protecting employees engaging in activities not spelled out in the statute. Id.; see also Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation, 563 U.S. 1, 4 (2011) (holding that the FLSA’s statutory term “filed any complaint” includes oral as well as written complaints); Brock, 812 F.2d 121 (finding that Section 15(a)(3) protection applies where an employer fired an employee based on a mistaken belief that the employee had filed a complaint with the Department of Labor).

The Third Circuit further reasoned that the FLSA’s humanitarian purpose is dependent on “a workplace environment conducive to employee reporting.” Id. at *12 (citing Brock, 812 F.2d at 123-24). Therefore, the court’s guiding principle is to prevent fear of retaliation from “chilling employees’ assertion of FLSA rights.” Id. Employees’ ability to bring collective actions is vital to the FLSA’s enforcement. See Halle v. West Penn Allegheny Health Sys. Inc., 842 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2016).

The Third Circuit’s decision in Uronis makes it clear that the FLSA’s retaliation provisions are to be interpreted broadly. Employees across New Jersey should know that there are statutory protections in place, with effective enforcement mechanisms, to ensure that they are able to report, complain, or other wise call out employer wrongdoing without suffering an adverse employment action.

To read more about FLSA protections, click here: https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/fact-sheets/77a-flsa-prohibiting-retaliation.

If you have any questions about this decision, the FLSA’s employee protections, or any other employment law concerns, contact a Hyderally & Associates attorney.

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